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Court overrides costs assessment limits 
 
 
Branson v Tucker [2012] NSWCA310 
 
 
Given similarities in the relevant provisions of New South Wales and Queensland legislation 
relating to costs, practitioners can anticipate that a court may examine the reasonableness 
of costs, even under a costs agreement and even though applicable time limits have passed. 
 
Costs - barrister claiming amount in bill of costs rendered to firm of solicitors - amount 
claimed under costs agreement - amount disputed after expiration of time for assessment 
under Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) - whether District Court had jurisdiction to 
determine reasonableness of costs - whether jurisdiction ousted by statutory costs 
assessment regime 
In Branson v Tucker [2012] NSWCA310 a barrister who had been retained by solicitors to 
provide legal services for the benefit of the solicitors’ client sued those solicitors in the 
District Court to recover his fees. 
The barrister and solicitors had entered into a costs agreement. The key question for 
determination was whether, in circumstances where there had been no application under 
the Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) (LPA) for an assessment of the costs the subject of the 
barrister’s bill and it was no longer possible for such an application to be made, the solicitors 
were unable to dispute their liability for the amount claimed. 
Background 
The applicant was a barrister and the respondents were a firm of solicitors. The respondents 
briefed the applicant in September 2009 to advise and appear for some clients of the 
respondents in litigation then pending in the Federal Court of Australia in Sydney. In the 
Federal Court proceedings the applicant had been successful in all respects, with the 
proceedings resulting in orders very favourable to the respondents’ clients. 
A costs agreement had been entered into between the applicant and the respondents, 
providing hourly rates for various work and a daily rate for hearing days. An initial estimate 
of a total fee of about $65,000 was provided, but there were several subsequent revisions of 
that estimate with the final estimate being for $179,000. There was also a provision that 
interest would be charged, at a specified rate, on any fees that were outstanding more than 
30 days. 
The amount of fees ultimately rendered, excluding GST, was $229,225. One of the 
memoranda of fees rendered by the applicant as the matter progressed, for an amount of 
$109,532.50, was questioned and at least initially, not paid. On 1 March 2010, the 
respondents sought to have that memorandum of fees assessed under the LPA, but they 
were unsuccessful because the 60-day period allowed by s351(3) of the LPA for the making 
of such an application had elapsed. 
The applicant sued the respondents in the District Court of New South Wales seeking to 
recover the amount of unpaid fees, together with interest as allowed under the costs 
agreement, and costs. In their defence and cross-claim, the respondents pleaded that the 
charges were far in excess of the estimates, that the hours charged exceeded what was 
reasonably and necessarily required, that there was a breach of the implied term of the 
retainer in this regard and that the respondents had suffered loss by reason of the breach. 
The cross-claim repeated matters pleaded in the defence. 
The applicant filed a notice of motion for orders including the striking out of that defence 
and cross-claim under r14.28 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW). It was 
contended that the defence and cross-claim were clearly untenable and could not succeed. 
On 23 May 2011, Judge Quirk dismissed the applicant’s notice of motion and granted leave 
to the respondents to file and serve an amended defence and cross-claim. 
The applicant sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal. The application for leave was 
heard on the basis that the court heard all of the argument that would be put if leave to 
appeal were to be granted. It was common ground that the relevant law to apply was the 
law of New South Wales. 
Legislation  
The application was assessed against a background of the provisions contained in the LPA 
governing the manner in which barristers can be engaged, and the charging and assessment 
of legal costs. 
Part 3.2 of the LPA relates to costs disclosure and assessment, with the purpose for that part 
set out in s301. Paragraph (d) of that section specifies as one such purpose: “to provide a 
mechanism for the assessment of legal costs and the setting aside of certain costs 
agreements”. 
Sections 319 provides: 
319 On what basis are legal costs recoverable? 
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Part, legal costs are recoverable: 
(a) in accordance with an applicable fixed costs provision, or 
(b) if paragraph (a) does not apply, under a costs agreement made in 
accordance with Division 5 or the corresponding provisions of a 
corresponding law, or 
(c) if neither paragraph (a) or (b) applies, according to the fair and reasonable 
value of the legal services provided. 
Section 326 provides: 
326 Effect of costs agreement 
Subject to this Division and Division 11, a costs agreement may be enforced in the 
same way as any other contract. 
Division 11 of Part 3.2 (ss349A to 395A) deals with costs assessment. Section 366 (Court or 
tribunal may determine matters) states that Division 11 does not limit any power of a court 
or a tribunal to determine in any particular case the amount of costs payable or that the 
amount of the costs is to be determined on the indemnity basis. 
Analysis 
It was submitted for the applicant that Division 11 of Part 3.2 of the LPA provides an 
exclusive scheme whereby bills of costs are assessed by costs assessors; and that this 
scheme is one of the exceptions that the LPA recognises to a costs agreement being 
enforceable in the same way as any other contract. Since the respondents did not seek an 
assessment under Division 11 within the 60-day period allowed under s351(3) of the LPA 
(Application for costs assessment by law practice retaining another law practice) the 
applicant argued that they could not subsequently seek to question the reasonableness of 
the costs by a different procedure. 
The leading judgment was delivered by Campbell JA, with whose reasons Beazley and 
Barrett JJA agreed. His Honour examined a number of decisions relied on by the applicant, 
but found nothing in any of these decisions to advance the contention that the costs 
assessment process provided by the LPA is the only means by which the reasonableness of 
legal costs can be ascertained. 
The applicant also sought to support his contention by pointing to the absence of any 
provision in the LPA conferring power on the District Court to decide the reasonableness of 
costs. Campbell JA noted however, that it was the jurisdiction conferred by s44(1) of the 
District Court Act 1973 (NSW) that the applicant invoked in his claim against the 
respondents for breach of contract. His Honour was satisfied that it was also that 
jurisdiction that the respondents sought to invoke in their defence and cross-claim, in 
contending that there had been a breach of a term implied in the same contract. 
It was noted that s319 is the only specific provision in the LPA which assists with assessing 
the reasonableness of legal costs. Campbell JA accepted that, as there was an applicable 
costs agreement, s319(1)(c) did not apply here so as to allow the costs to be recoverable 
according to the fair and reasonable value of the legal services provided. His Honour 
emphasised however, that the respondents implicitly accepted in the defence and cross-
claim that the applicant was entitled to recover whatever fees were properly payable to him 
in accordance with the costs agreement. They asserted that it was an implied term of the 
costs agreement itself that imposed a limitation on that right. The limitation was that the 
applicant was entitled to be paid only for those services that were reasonable and 
necessary, in light of his standing and level of professed skill as evidenced by the rate of fees 
he charged, to carry out the retainer. 
 
Campbell JA then considered in some detail relevant legislation and authorities relating both 
to the circumstances and manner in which barristers are entitled to sue for their fees; and 
also to the question of whether reasonableness of fees could be contested other than by 
assessment. His Honour noted in this context that s301 of the LPA states that one of the 
purposes of Part 3.2 of the LPA is “to provide a mechanism for the assessment of legal 
costs”; and that it was not “to provide the mechanism for the assessment of legal costs.” 
 
His Honour also referred to s98 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (Courts power as to costs) 
and found this would provide a very significant exception to any exclusivity there might 
otherwise be of the assessment scheme created under Division 11 of the LPA. 
 
The decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Attard v James Legal Pty Ltd [2010] 
NSWCA 311 presented a particular difficulty for the applicant. In that case Tobias JA (with 
whose reasons on this issue Beazley and Giles JJA agreed) had stated (at [179]-[181]) that 
Division 6 of Part 11 of the then Legal Profession Act 1987 (NSW) (Assessment of Costs) did 
not provide a complete and exclusive code as to how legal costs were to be assessed. The 
applicant sought leave to argue that Attard was wrongly decided. After analysing the 
submissions put for the applicant however, Campbell JA was not persuaded that the 
decision in Attard was wrong, or that there was sufficient prospect that the Court of Appeal 
would overrule its previous decision so as to warrant the grant of leave. The requested leave 
was refused. 
 
The court concluded that Division 11 of Part 3.2 of the LPA did not provide an exclusive 
means by which the reasonableness of legal costs could be ascertained. Accordingly, the 
defence and cross-claim that the respondents sought to raise (in both their original and 
amended forms) were not precluded by any such exclusivity. The applicant was granted 
leave to appeal, and the appeal was dismissed, with costs. 
 
Comment 
 
As the court acknowledged, the key issue for determination in this case ultimately 
depended on construction of the Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW). Any decision considering 
a similar issue in the context of the Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) (the Queensland Act) 
must involve examination of the provisions of that Act, as well as other relevant Queensland 
legislation and case law. 
 
It may be noted, however, that the Queensland Act contains provisions which correspond to 
several of the key provisions examined in this decision. In particular ss319 and 326 
correspond in material respects to their New South Wales counterparts. In relation to the 
purposes of Part 3.4 (Costs disclosure and assessment), paragraph (d) of s299 is in almost 
identical terms to s301 of the LPA. It identifies as one of the main purposes of Part 3.4 of the 
Queensland Act “to provide a mechanism for the assessment of legal costs and the setting 
aside of particular costs agreements”. Also, the rules in Chapter 17A of the Uniform 
Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) include rules which provide the court with wide powers in 
relation to costs, which may be compared with those found in s98 of the Civil Procedure Act 
2005 (NSW). 
 
The decision will accordingly be relevant and persuasive in the context of the Queensland 
Act. Practitioners should anticipate that the reasonableness in the circumstances of their 
costs may be examined by the court even when those costs are charged under a costs 
agreement and even though the applicable time periods for applications for assessment 
under Division 7 of Part 3.4 of the Queensland Act have expired. 
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